Africa: Why a Jihadist Takeover of a Sahelian Capital Is No longer going

Regardless of a latest surge in terrorist attacks, the area is extra at threat of fragmentation than centralised jihadist rule.

Insecurity has risen sharply in the Sahel in latest months. Between late May and early June, major attacks claimed by Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) targeted various locations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

This resurgence underscores the two groups’ adaptive capabilities and questions the efficacy of counter-terrorism strategies carried out by the Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) military-led governments. In consequence, some analysts are concerned about the potential for a Sahelian capital to fall below jihadist management – drawing parallels to the December 2024 capture of Damascus by scare neighborhood Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Nevertheless, there are critical contextual distinctions between the two scenarios. In contrast to HTS, which has consistently pursued regime change to place itself as a political-spiritual alternative, JNIM and ISGS existing no intent to steal vitality in the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey or Ouagadougou.

Rather, their strategies emphasise the gradual erosion of state authority in rural peripheries the place they mediate local conflicts, put in power norms and gather taxes. This underscores their comparatively miniature operational capacity. JNIM and ISGS primarily operate in far off rural areas, the usage of gentle weapons such as rifles, machine weapons, rocket launchers and mortars. They also utilise bikes, improvised explosive devices and weaponised civilian drones.

Although they have taken and temporarily controlled towns in the internal, such as Djibo and Diapaga, they lack the firepower and logistical capabilities to sustain a extended siege and occupation of a major metropolis. Their strength lies in mobility and local data rather than the capacity to occupy and govern territory for long sessions.

HTS, by contrast, developed a structured military power with centralised command and tactical devices capable of coordinated assaults supported by drones and heavy artillery. The neighborhood had sustained access to sophisticated weaponry via successfully-organised transnational offer traces.

The fall of Damascus represented the culmination of a broader regime-change dynamic situation in stream by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and bolstered, to varying degrees, by some Western and Gulf international locations. For a while, HTS capitalised on key faulty-border corridors – particularly with Turkey – that enabled the steady influx of overseas fighters, medical aid, munitions and advanced weapons systems.

No comparable geopolitical architecture exists in the Sahel. Whereas weapons trafficking from Libya has strengthened some armed groups, there may be now not any longer any declared international effort aimed at toppling the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Although AES leaders repeatedly accuse overseas actors – notably France – of supporting terrorism or destabilising the area, start-offer data offers little evidence of this. Even Algeria, whose position in northern Mali has occasionally been ambivalent, has by no means sought to overthrow the governmentin Bamako.

Another level of distinction is the internal dynamics of state militaries. The fall of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and ultimately Damascus, occurred inner lawful two weeks. This was primarily due to the miniature resistance by the Syrian Army – weakened by a decade of conflicts, widespread defections and deteriorating living standards.

In contrast, the capabilities of armies in Sahelian international locations are increasing. These militaries are ideologically and institutionally resistant to jihadists, perceiving them as existential threats to their respective governments. Moreover, having assumed political vitality, AES military leaders have entrenched their authority for the duration of the state apparatus, bolstering their obligation and accountability.

Also, the upward push of HTS was enabled by the exhaustion of a war-weary Syrian population and economic collapse, additional aggravated by international sanctions. Dissatisfied by Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime, many Syrians viewed HTS as both a lesser scandalous or, in some cases, a extra favourable alternative.

The Sahel situation is starkly assorted. Although hardline Islamist ideologies have chanced on some traction in urban centres, public sentiment in the capital cities remains antagonistic towards jihadists who are perceived as instigators of violence, instability and national suffering.

For now, these factors collectively render the capture and sustained management of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces improbable. JNIM and ISGS will probably restrict themselves to guerrilla and destabilisation tactics.

As history reveals, on the alternative hand, this does no longer make these cities resistant to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup was introduced about by military setbacks in the north. Similarly, Burkina Faso’s January 2022 coup occurred following a mutiny introduced about by escalating casualties among safety forces.

Pondering the AES international locations’ protracted military transitions and constrained political environments, additional upheavals leading to institutional breakdowns and a disorganisation of safety forces cannot be ruled out. This can have unpredictable penalties for the Sahel and West Africa at large.

To avoid this, AES governments must acknowledge the strategic limitations of their militarised approach to terrorism. Whereas increasing troop numbers and acquiring advanced weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures haven’t incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the area’s epicentre for terrorism for the 2d consecutive year, accounting for half of all global casualties.

The youthful appearance of the assailants in the foiled 2 June Timbuktu attack wishes to be a wake-up call to AES strategists. It displays a generation of formative years deprived of education due to continual insecurity, and whose families lack access to earnings, justice and essential social companies. These factors are potent drivers of recruitment into armed groups – and cannot be solved via military means alone.

AES governments need a coherent, area-vast counter-terrorism strategy that goes past military interventions. Valuable insights can be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin’s disengagement and reintegration programmes, Mauritania’s spiritual dialogue initiatives, and Algeria’s non-kinetic approach. Equally important is the deserve to engage with communities stigmatised by counter-terrorism operations, fostering belief and decreasing the threat of recruitment.

Enhanced relations with Algeria and the Economic Neighborhood of West African States may perhaps bolster regional cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening the collective capacity to decrease the threat posed by armed groups.

Without a meaningful recalibration of strategy, the Sahel may perhaps tumble into extended fragmentation, with profound penalties for West Africa’s stability.

Djiby Sow, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel

Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel