Shifting protection force dynamics, political fragmentation and external interference would possibly per chance even escalate clashes, pushing the nation towards partition.
The war in Sudan has taken a dramatic turn for the worse. Changes in battlefield ways, alongside with unusual political and diplomatic dynamics, are hampering mediation – and would possibly per chance per chance examine Sudan divided beneath two or extra rival administrations.
During the first quarter of 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) – on the defensive since the war started in April 2023 – recaptured territories held by its rival Speedily Toughen Forces (RSF). Then on 23 February, the SAF amended the nation’s 2019 transitional structure to eliminate all references to the RSF.
In response, the RSF introduced a charter and structure for a ‘unusual Sudan’ and started establishing a parallel executive to rival the Sovereign Council essentially essentially based mostly in Port Sudan beneath the management of SAF commander Fashioned Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. In the intervening time, the civilian coalition Taqaddum carve up into two factions: Qimam, aligned with the RSF, and the neutral Somoud.
These trends bear stoked concerns about the nation’s doable fragmentation and a critical escalation in fighting. The present wave of SAF protection force successes started with the onset of the dry season in October 2024. Prior to the season ends in Might perchance presumably well per chance, the SAF would possibly per chance even ramp up operations, seeking decisive protection force gains in particular in and around Khartoum.
The RSF plans a wide counter-offensive to reclaim lost territory and lengthen its attain to other formula of the nation. This would aggravate the already dire humanitarian crisis and increase human rights violations, at the same time as some internally displaced of us return to ‘liberated’ areas. A reversal of SAF battlefield gains is now not now not doable, and would continue the seesaw balance of vitality that has characterised the war.
The war would possibly per chance even also significantly swap the Horn of Africa’s geostrategic landscape, in particular if the proposed parallel executive gains traction. Multilateral organisations similar to the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) bear condemned the opinion because it contradicts the principle of the integrity of nationwide borders.
Ethiopia, now not too long in the past elected to the AU Peace and Security Council, is anticipated to formula the peril cautiously to steer distinct of inflaming its bear secessionist movements.
Kenya’s hosting of the RSF and allied Sudanese groups to finalise the charter for a parallel executive sparked controversy. However the nation has but to steal a distinct stance on the matter. Ongoing diplomatic tensions with Port Sudan stem from Kenyan President William Ruto’s conclude relationship with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).
Despite the truth that the verbalize’s Intergovernmental Authority on Pattern has now not articulated a unified verbalize, Uganda has rejected the RSF proposal. South Sudan remains mute, perchance for concern of worsening its strained relationship with its northern neighbour.
The RSF looks increasingly isolated, with Libya being its most important supporter due to Hemedti’s ties with Libyan National Military commander Fashioned Khalifa Haftar. Even Chad, which had beforehand granted the RSF protection force bases, is wavering.
The positions of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and United Arab Emirates (UAE) underscore the complexities of foreign involvement in Sudan. Alliances between external actors and Sudan’s main warring parties would seemingly persist, even with a parallel executive.
Turkey is allegedly supplying protection force technology to each and each sides whereas concurrently brokering a deal between the SAF and UAE. Russia too has links with each and each the RSF and SAF. These strikes trusty Russia and Turkey’s interests in Sudan, regardless of which belligerent wins the war.
While the UAE has now not taken a definitive stance, its longstanding ties and diplomatic strategies counsel a need for the RSF. Sudan’s most up-to-date petition to the International Court docket of Justice looks fascinated with highlighting the UAE’s links to the RSF rather than addressing the human rights violations allegedly committed during the war – of which every and each sides stand accused.
Consolidation of SAF protection force gains would possibly per chance even finish the war. Nevertheless, whereas the SAF would possibly per chance even overrun additional states in Sudan, the RSF perchance is maybe now not defeated rapidly. With the toughen of rather a lot of armed and unarmed groups, and RSF offer lines linked to Chad and Libya, a power war would possibly per chance even ensue, leading to either a de facto division of the nation or a negotiated separation.
The various can be a long guerrilla war involving many factions. While the SAF and RSF profess their dedication to Sudanese solidarity, they are backed by opposing civilian groups, local militias, and unpredictable external entities with seemingly irreconcilable ideological differences. And the belligerents’ positions reinforce division rather than nationwide solidarity.
The unusual RSF charter endorses secularism. In the intervening time, the SAF’s removing of all references to the RSF in Sudan’s transitional structure looks to gain the continuing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the SAF. The SAF’s reluctance to negotiate with the neutral Somoud coalition, and the main parties’ hardline positions and insistence on a protection force resolution, manufacture compromise and a permanent ceasefire seem now perchance now not.
Establishing two rival administrations in Sudan would possibly per chance even consequence in a power war, making the AU’s mediation efforts extra tough. The belligerents would defer extra to their external supporters than the AU, and civilians and internal armed groups would develop into increasingly fragmented or continue seeking recognition from the RSF or SAF.
The AU High-level Panel and AU Committee of Five Heads of Command would possibly per chance even bear anticipated the shifts in alliances, but manufacture now not seem to bear tailored to the chance of disintegration. The AU’s ongoing pursuit of a unified Sudan is becoming increasingly disconnected from realities on the flooring. The organisation must modify its mediation to incorporate the chance of Sudan splitting.
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Apart from the RSF’s proposal, Darfuri groups – marginalised by successive governments in Khartoum – bear beforehand referred to as for separation from Sudan. Such demands are challenging but now not extraordinary, as proven by South Sudan’s carve up from Sudan in 2011. Nevertheless, the consequences of division must tranquil be fastidiously assessed.
By maintaining the present mediation layout, the AU risks inadvertently facilitating Sudan’s separation without true preparation. The unparalleled-discussed division of labour between the AU and UN on peacebuilding, alongside with an expanded mediation mechanism, is indispensable. A multi-layered, multi-actor blueprint, presumably involving proxy processes, wants to be explored.
In June 2024, the PSC instructed its sanctions sub-committee to investigate those providing protection force, political and financial toughen to Sudan’s warring factions. This evidence is now urgently wanted to enable the AU to aim those in Africa and past who unilaterally contravene its frameworks.
This text was once first published by the ISS’s PSC Represent.
Moses Chrispus Okello, Senior Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Evaluation, ISS Addis Ababa
