Liberia: Supreme Court Demands ‘Biased Prefer’ to Recuse Himself in Tweah’s Case

The Supreme Court of Liberia has intervened in the ongoing economic sabotage case involving vulnerable Finance Minister Samuel Tweah, ordering Prefer Blamo Dixon of Criminal Court ‘C’ to recuse himself over issues of bias. Chamber Justice Yarmie Quiqui Gbeisay issued the directive, citing prejudicial remarks by the settle that, according to the prosecution, undermined the integrity of the trial.

The controversy stems from remarks made by Prefer Dixon while presiding over a dispute in regards to the validity of an US$8 million bond secured by Tweah to advantage a long way from detention. In his December 20, 2024 ruling, Prefer Dixon wondered: “The court wonders whether or not the detention of only co-defendant Samuel D. Tweah, Jr., at the Monrovia Central Prison Compound will help to establish the case of the prosecution against the defendants.” The authorities attorneys argued that this assertion, among others, printed a lack of impartiality and beneficial the settle used to be compromised.

Justice Gbeisay, in his ruling, acknowledged that the Supreme Court came accurate thru Prefer Dixon’s habits and comments inappropriate, namely in a case that has drawn critical public consideration. “The Supreme Court is appalled by such statements of the trial judge,” Gbeisay said. He criticized Dixon’s commentary, questioning why a settle would gain such an announcement in a peaceable case, adding that it used to be prejudicial to the prosecution’s interests.

Gbeisay emphasized the moral principle that judges have to no longer easiest be honest nonetheless have to also appear to be honest. “The purpose of an objection to a bond is not to jail the accused but to correct such defects so that the bond will be legally sufficient and meet the standards set by the statute,” he explained, noting that the prosecution used to be merely exercising its appropriate to quiz the bond’s validity.

He further careworn that judicial neutrality is paramount, stating, “Our law requires that all parties must enjoy the neutrality of a judge. This mandate requires that the judge confine himself as much as possible to his own responsibilities and leave to counsel and members of the jury their respective functions.”

In rejecting the authorities’s initial motion for recusal, Prefer Dixon argued that the prosecution failed to display mask legit moral grounds for his elimination. He claimed that under Liberian law, recusal is warranted easiest in instances of demonstrable war of interest, confirmed blood kin, or utterly different statutory causes established by the Supreme Court. On the opposite hand, the Supreme Court disagreed, with Justice Gbeisay asserting that a settle’s perceived bias, whether accurate or implied, is sufficient grounds for recusal.

“If a judge, by his actions and words, has caused a party in a case before him to believe that he is biased and prejudiced in the matter, and the party reasonably believes they will not get a fair trial, the judge, for the sake of transparency and justice, should recuse himself,” Gbeisay said. He added, “Judges must be free from any improper influence such as pressure by individual litigants or other undue influence.”

Justice Gbeisay vulnerable the ruling to underscore the broader principle of judicial integrity. “It is of great importance that courts should be free from reproach, as the judiciary should enjoy an elevated rank in the estimation of mankind,” he said. “A judge is expected to apply and interpret the law in a neutral way, and that must be seen from his general conduct, deportment, and behavior in and out of court.”

The Supreme Court finally granted the authorities’s petition for a writ of certiorari, leading to Dixon’s elimination from the case. The decision reinforced the principle that a trial have to no longer easiest be dazzling nonetheless have to even be perceived as dazzling by all events involved. Gbeisay concluded by reminding all judges that their words and actions have to no longer gain even the appears of bias or partiality, as this erodes public self assurance in the judiciary.

This pattern follows a heated moral strive against in which authorities attorneys accused Prefer Dixon of bias and wondered the validity of ethical documents filed by Tweah’s protection crew. The prosecution argued that one in all Tweah’s attorneys used to be no longer licensed to note in Liberia, rendering earlier filings invalid. These allegations further complex the already contentious case.

The elimination of Prefer Dixon marks a critical step in a trial closely watched by the final public, as it involves excessive-profile allegations of economic sabotage. The Supreme Court’s decision underscores its commitment to ensuring a dazzling judicial activity, free from any taint of bias or impropriety.